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NOTES
BEYOND UNITED STATES v. VALENZUELA-BERNAL:
CAN THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COMPULSORY
PROCESS SURVIVE IN PROSECUTIONS FOR
TRANSPORTING ILLEGAL ALIENS?
Over one million undocumented' aliens attempt to enter the
United States each year.2 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) of the United States Department of Justice has appre-
hended over ten million illegal aliens since 1920. 3 Although the
apprehension rate is rising,4 the INS estimates that it apprehends
only ten percent of all illegal entrants.
5
Congress has determined that the prompt deportation of these
aliens constitutes the most effective means of curbing the illegal traf-
fic. To effectuate prompt deportation, Congress has authorized Bor-
der Patrol agents to make warrantless arrests of aliens suspected of
attempting to enter the United States in violation of U.S. immigra-
tion laws.6 Agents may examine the aliens without "unnecessary
delay" to determine whether "there is prima facie evidence establish-
1. For simplicity, this Note will use interchangeably the terms "illegal" and
"undocumented" to refer to persons who are within the United States without legal
authorization. Technically, "illegal" refers to an individual who has been found by an
immigration judge or Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) officer to have entered
the country unlawfully or to have overstayed a visa. See United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 553 n.9 (1976). "Undocumented" is a catch-all phrase; it may also
refer to persons holding fraudulent or misused documents.
2. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (102d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
3. THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESOURCES, ILLE-
GAL ALIENS: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PROBLEMS AND
POLICIES].
4. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 91. In 1980 the INS located 759,400
deportable aliens. Id.
5. PROBLEMS AND POLICIES, supra note 3, at 1. The majority of apprehended illegal
aliens (approximately eighty-five percent) are Mexican. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ILLEGAL ALIENS: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND
5 (1977). An INS study reported that at least 500,000 illegal entrants successfully eluded
INS detection in 1975. U.S. DEP'TS OF JUSTICE AND STATE, IMMIGRATIoN-NEED TO
REASSESS U.S. POLICY 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DEP'TS OF JUSTICE AND STATE].
6. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (1976). In 1980 there
were 2,339 authorized Border Patrol agents of the INS. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 2, at 91.
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ing" an attempted illegal entry.7 If the agents find the requisite evi-
dence, they may forego formal deportation proceedings and grant
the aliens immediate "voluntary departure" from the United States.8
When the federal government prosecutes an individual for
"bringing in and harboring" an illegal alien,9 the transported alien is
a witness to the alleged crime. The defendant may desire to have the
alien detained, questioned by defense counsel, and called to testify at
trial. The INS, however, wants to return the alien to his country
promptly.' 0 If the government unilaterally decides to return the
alien to his country prior to questioning by defense counsel, the
defendant may claim that the government's action has deprived him
of his Sixth Amendment right "to have compulsory process for
obtaining Witnesses in his favor.""I Thus the government must rec-
oncile the confficting interests of the INS and the defendant. The
7. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1982).
8. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b) (West 1970 and Supp. 1981); 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2) (1982).
Voluntary departure allows an alien to reapply for admission without seeking special
permission as required of deported aliens. 1 C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFIELD, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND PROCEDURES § 2.33 (1982).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976). See infra note 27.
10. The government must also consider the interests of the alien. See Brief for the
United States, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. Brief].
[R]elease of the illegal aliens directly protects substantial human values by not
requiring these individuals to be incarcerated unless necessary to a just resolu-
tion of the criminal case. . . . [T]he detention of any head of a family for a
period of days without any income can work a substantial hardship on the family
Id. at 17, 18.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The last two decades have been marked by a trend toward higher standards of proce-
dural fairness for the criminal defendant. Scattered Supreme Court decisions have
broached a virtually unexplored area of criminal procedure-the compulsory process
and confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him [and] to have compulsory process for
obtaining Witnesses in his favor ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
These companion clauses entitle the accused to present a defense by guaranteeing to
him the right to produce and present evidence through witnesses. The confrontation
clause guarantees an accused the right to elicit evidence from "witnesses against him."
The compulsory process clause guarantees the defendant the right to produce and elicit
evidence from "Witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For an in-depth analy-
sis of these principles, see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71
(1974); Westen, Compulsory Process 1, 74 MICH. L. REv. 191 (1974); Westen, Confronta-
tion and Compulsory Process- A UnyFed Theory of Evidencefor Criminal Cases, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 567 (1977-1978).
Both clauses guarantee the defendant the right to insist that the government make a
good-faith effort to produce witnesses for his use at trial; neither clause requires that the
government produce witnesses who are no longer available, provided the government is
not responsible for their absence. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1976); FED. R. EvID.
804(a), infra note 192. Finally, the two principles ensure that the accused may examine
witnesses and introduce the witnesses' testimony into evidence.
ILLEGAL IMMIGRA TION
Executive must faithfully execute the immigration policy adopted by
Congress, 12 but it must also ensure that the- criminal defendant
receives the fundamental fairness inherent in due process.' 3
Which responsibility takes precedence? Confronting this
dilemma in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,14 the Supreme Court
narrowed the scope of the compulsory process clause. The Court
held that a unilateral determination by the government that the ille-
gal-alien witness is immaterial to the defense of the accused, fol-
lowed by the alien's deportation, does not necessarily violate the
defendant's right to compulsory process. The defendant now bears
the burden of making a "plausible showing that the testimony of the
deported witness would have been material and favorable to his
defense in ways not merely cumulative to testimony of available wit-
nesses."15 If the defendant sustains this burden, he establishes a vio-
lation of the compulsory process clause and the court must dismiss
the indictment.16
Concurring in result in Valenzuela-Bernal, Justice O'Connor
commented that a "governmental policy of deliberately putting
potential defense witnesses beyond the reach of compulsory process
is not easily reconciled with the spirit of the compulsory process
clause."17 Nevertheless, the Justice Department successfully argued
before the Court that the clause must be interpreted narrowly if a
"proper and reasonable"' 8 balance is to be struck between the duties
of the federal government, the interests of the criminal defendant,
and the concerns of the alien witness. This Note argues that the
government can achieve a "proper and reasonable" balance without
narrowing the scope of the compulsory process clause. First, the
Note identifies the government's concerns regarding illegal immigra-
tion and presents an overview of the historical development of com-
pulsory process. It then analyzes the Supreme Court's recent
interpretation of the compulsory process clause in United States v.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Congress assigned the President the duty to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed." The President executes the immigration laws
through the INS.
13. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe the
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare
a denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the
trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair
trial.
d.
14. 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982).
15. Id. at 3449-50.
16. See infra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
17. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. at 3451.
18. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 8.
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Valenzuela-Bernal and concludes with a presentation of proposals
for pretrial procedural reform that would strike a balance between
the interests of the defendant, the alien witness, and the prosecution.
I
THE PROBLEM
Immigrants, both legal and illegal, are entering the United
States in greater numbers than at any time since the early 1900s. 19
The Census Bureau has estimated that between three and one-half
million and six million people are in this country illegally.20 The
smuggling of aliens has become one of the principal problems facing
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Professional smugglers
significantly increase the illegal alien population by soliciting clients
in the interior of Mexico and in the Central American countries, par-
ticularly Guatemala and El Salvador.21 The aliens usually lack the
knowledge and experience necessary for a successful, unaided illegal
entry.22 The smuggler provides entry assistance and may offer entry
guarantees, credit terms, and job placement.23 The smuggling of
aliens has become an extremely lucrative illegal venture with afford-
able risks; the government currently prosecutes less than half of all
known smuggling violations.24
The Constitution delegates to Congress the power to control the
entry of aliens into the United States.25 In addition to the civil obli-
gations detailed in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,26
19. In 1979, 152,300,000 aliens entered the United States. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 2, at 91.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY (1981),
reprinted in 58 Interpreter Releases 29, app. I (1981). Fifty percent of the illegal immi-
grants are from Mexico. Id.
21. The INS is encountering growing numbers of aliens coming from Central and
South American countries. During fiscal year 1979, Border Patrol agents apprehended
172,688 undocumented aliens who were either smuggled into the United States or trans-
ported unlawfully after entry. 1979 INS ANN. REP. 4. During fiscal year 1974, the INS
Southwest Region spent approximately $1.6 million on plane fare to remove aliens from
the United States. U.S. DEP'TS OF JUSTICE AND STATE, SMUGGLERS, ILLICIT DOCU-
MENTS, AND SCHEMES ARE UNDERMINING U.S. CONTROLS OVER IMMIGRATION 8 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SMUGGLERS, ILLICIT DOCUMENTS].
22. SMUGGLERS, ILLICIT DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 8.
23. I1d.
24. Id. at 5. In 1980, Border Patrol agents located 13,100 smugglers. They appre-
hended 112,600 smuggled aliens. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 92.
25. Congressional authority to control immigration is found in Article 1, Section 8 of
the Constitution, which empowers Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations"
and to "establish a uniform rule of naturalization." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
26. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976). Possession of
an immigrant or non-immigrant visa does not assure entry into the United States, Upon
arrival at a port of entry, an alien may be denied admittance by immigration officers, in
the officers' discretion, under one or several of the Act's more than thirty exclusionary
[Vol. 16:81
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Congress created criminal sanctions to promote effective enforce-
ment of immigration laws.27
Immigration officers cannot impose criminal punishment. Only
the courts, which operate under the procedural safeguards pre-
scribed by the Constitution, possess the power to determine guilt and
fix punishment for crime.
28
grounds. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1225 (1976). Permanent exclusion can be ordered only by an
immigration judge at an exclusionary hearing. Aliens with visas can also be deported
once they are in the United States if. (1) they have not entered the country through a
port of entry; (2) they have stayed in the U.S. beyond the time allowed by their visas; or
(3) they have committed one or more of the Act's grounds for deportation. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1976).
27. Section 274(a) of the 1952 Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976), defines the
criminal offenses and corresponding punishments relevant to this Note's analysis:
§ 1324. Bringing in and harboring certain aliens; persons liable; authority to
arrest
(a) Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding
officer, agent, or consignees of any means of transportation who-
(1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of trans-
portation or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to
bring into or land in the United States, by any means of transportation
or otherwise;
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and
knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into
the United States occurred less than three years prior thereto, trans-
ports, or moves, or attempts to transport or move, within the United
States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such
violation of law;
(3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detec-
tion, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, in any
place, including any building or any means of transportation; or
(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to
encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the
United States of-
any alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by an immigration
officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States under
the terms of this chapter or any other law relating to the immigration or expul-
sion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of
this subsection occurs: Provided, however, That for the purposes of this section,
employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment)
shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.
This statute has had an interesting evolution. For a discussion, see United States v.
Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948). Before 1917, the statute penalized only offenses related to
smuggling. The Act of 1917 went one step further and proscribed harboring and con-
cealing illegal entrants (Act of Feb. 5, 1917, § 8, 39 Stat. 874, 880), but due to an ambigu-
ity in the appended language, the Supreme Court ruled that no sanctions had been
proscribed for the harboring and concealing features of the statute. Evans, 333 U.S. at
483. Congress remedied this omission in a 1952 enactment (Act of March 20, 1952, 66
Stat. 26), which shortly thereafter was reenacted as Section 274(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. Federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of the section. See
Herrera v. United States, 208 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1954); Martinez-Quiroz v. United States,
210 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1954); Bland v. United States, 299 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1962).
28. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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A. THE COMPULSORY PROCESS GUARANTEE
The specific question before the Court in United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal was whether the government had violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process when it
interfered with the defendant's ability to discover, prepare, or offer
exculpatory evidence by deporting a witness who was an illegal
alien. The government knew, or had reason to know, that the wit-
ness's testimony could conceivably have benefitted the defendant,
yet it deported the alien before defense counsel had a reasonable
opportunity to interview him.29
L Historical Perspective
The authors of the Bill of Rights included the right to compul-
sory process in the Sixth Amendment to prevent injustices like those
caused by the medieval common-law rule that in felony cases the
accused could not introduce witnesses in his defense.30 Although the
British parliament abolished the prohibition of witnesses for the
defense prior to 1787,31 the authors of the Bill of Rights drafted the
compulsory process clause to ensure that "defendants in criminal
cases. . .[would] be provided the means of obtaining witnesses so
that their own evidence, as well as the prosecution's, might be evalu-
ated by the jury. '3
2
In 1807 Chief Justice John Marshall addressed the scope of the
compulsory process clause while presiding over the circuit court trea-
29. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. at 3443-44.
30. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, supra note 11, at 78. In England, the
history of compulsory process is one segment of the country's development from an
inquisitional to an adversarial trial procedure. During the late medieval period, criminal
cases were tried by jurors on the basis of their own prior knowledge of the facts without
hearing from witnesses for either side. Later, the jury did consider independent testi-
mony from prosecution witnesses but still refused to hear sworn testimony from the
defendant or his supporting witnesses. 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
580-81 (1938). See J. BELLAMY, CRIME AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER
MIDDLE AGES (1973); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (4th ed. 1936); 1 J.
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883); J. LANGBEIN, PROSE-
CUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 119 (1974); H. WAY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 97 (1980).
31. It was not until the studies of William Blackstone were accepted in Britain in the
Eighteenth Century that the "defendant finally received an equal opportunity with the
prosecution to present his case through witnesses." Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, supra note 11, at 78. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 575, at 685-86 (3d ed.
1940). Blackstone stated as a matter of principle that "in all caes of treason and felony,
all witnesses for the prisoner should be examined upon oath, in like manner as the wit-
nesses against him," and further "that he shall have the same compulsive process to bring
in his witnesses for him, as was usual to compel their appearance against him." 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 345, 354 (1769).
32. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20 (1967). See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 1833).
[Vol. 16:81
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son and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr.33 Marshall permitted
Burr to subpoena President Thomas Jefferson to .produce a letter
written to the President by General James Wilkinson. Marshall did
not require Burr to show specifically how he intended to use the let-
ter. Rather, Burr simply had to demonstrate that the letter might
prove helpful in impeaching an anticipated prosecution witness. The
Chief Justice held that it would be unreasonable to require a greater
showing before Burr knew what the witnesses would testify. Mar-
shall warned: "The right given by this article [the Sixth Amendment]
must be deemed sacred by the courts, and the article should be so
construed as to be something more than a dead letter."
34
Despite Marshall's warning, the compulsory process clause
effectively lay dormant for one hundred and seventy years, unti
3 5
the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Texas. 36 The deci-
sion mandates a constitutional standard to govern the presentation
of defense witnesses in criminal cases.
37
The Washington Court identified four essential elements of a
defendant's guarantee of compulsory process. The defendant has a
right to compel witnesses who are competent 38 to give testimony that
is relevant,39 material,4° and favorable41 to the defense. Though
33. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33 (C.C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692 D).
Marshall presided over the trial in his capacity as Circuit Judge.
34. Id.
35. During this time span the Court referred to the clause in only five cases. The
discussion of compulsory process was buried in dictum in two of the cases. See United
States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363-65 (1851), overruled in, Rosen v. United States,
245 U.S. 467 (1918); United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891). The remain-
ing three cases held that compulsory process was not a relevant factor in the Court's
decision. See Exparte Harding, 120 U.S. 783, 784 (1887); Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 442 (1932); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 n.1 (1966).
36. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). Seven justices joined in the opinion of Chief Justice Warren.
Justice Harlan concurred.
37. Before Washington, it was generally believed that the Sixth Amendment had no
effect on the law of evidence and that the amendment simply incorporated local stan-
dards for the issuance of subpoenas. See Washington v. State, 400 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1966); 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2191, at 69 (J. McNaugton rev. 1961).
38. There are two separate themes of the Washington opinion with respect to compe-
tence: (1) apriori categories (based on a witness's membership in a class) are generally
invalid and (2) matters of competence must usually be left to the factfinder. Thus, "the
defendant has a constitutional right to produce any witness whose ability to give reliable
evidence is something about which reasonable people can differ." Westen, Compulsory
Process 11, supra note 11, at 203. "The competency standard has constitutional implica-
tions for all rules-whether rules of competence or rules of evidence--that incapacitate
witnesses from testifying. . . .Thus it casts doubts on the validity of the opinion rule
and hearsay rule insofar as they would exclude evidence that may reasonably tend to
exculpate the defendant." Id. at 203 n.36.
39. Applying the nonconstitutional standard, evidence is relevant if it has "any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact . . . more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401. By applying the Washington test of
arbitrariness, the defendant has a "constitutional right to present any evidence that may
reasonably be deemed to establish the existence of facts in his favor." The first standard
88 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNVAL [Vol. 16:81
Washington is not to be regarded as a comprehensive test,42 the
holding explicitly directs the courts to recognize the special interests
of the accused and to acknowledge the corresponding right to pres-
ent a defense.
43
2. A Contemporary Application of Compulsory Process: The
Mendez-Rodriguez Doctrine
Until the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, the prevailing view of the relationship of the
compulsory process clause to cases involving illegal-alien witnesses
was rooted in the 1971 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v.
of relevance satisfies the constitutional requirements of the second. Westen, Compulsory
Process I, supra note 11, at 207.
40. Even when evidence is competent and relevant to a defendant's case,
he has no right to produce it if the impact of its exclusion will be too insignificant
in the context of the other evidence presented at trial to have any material bear-
ing on the outcome.
The issue of materiality, the conventional wisdom notwithstanding, ultimately
presents a question to be resolved by federal constitutional standards. . . . [T]o
say that evidence is material to the defendant's case is simply another way of
saying that its exclusion would be prejudicial by federal standards ....
1d. at 214. The defendant has a right to produce any witness whose testimony could
reasonably affect the judgment of the jury. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972), (citing Naupa v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)).
41. The final element of a defendant's right to compulsory process is not explicitly
identified in Washington, yet the very words of the compulsory process clause limit the
defendant to the production of favorable witnesses. See supra note 11. This requirement
has seldom been analyzed in terms of compulsory process claims; however, it has been
examined in cases dealing with defendant's analogous right, under the due process
clause, to produce favorable evidence that is in the government's possession.
The heart of the holding in [Brady v. Maryland] is the prosecution's suppression
of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is
favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment. Impor-
tant, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense,
(b) the evidence'srfavorable characterfor the defense, and (c) the materiality of the
evidence.
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972) (emphasis added). See also Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution
of evidencefavorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment .... ") (emphasis added).
42. For example, the Court specifically reserved the issue of whether a defendant had
the right to compel a witness to testify over assertions of privilege. 388 U.S. at 23 n.21.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-13 (1974) (dictum) (defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to produce witnesses in his favor overrides the Presidenes constitu-
tional claim of executive privilege for confidential communications).
43. The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the
right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a funda-
mental element of due process of law.
Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
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Mendez-Rodriguez.44 Mendez-Rodriguez held that the federal gov-
ernment violates a defendant's right to compulsory process when it
unilaterally deports an alien witness. 45 In the decade following Men-
dez-Rodriguez, four other circuits accepted the basic principles of
compulsory process as enunciated by the Ninth Circuit.
a. United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez
In United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez,46 a grand jury indicted
the defendant for transporting seven illegal Mexican aliens in viola-
tion of Section 1324(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
4 7
The federal government detained three of the Mexicans and
deported the remaining four prior to the defendant's indictment.
The decision to deport was a unilateral act by the United States
Attorney's Office. At trial the defendant testified that he was una-
ware that the passengers in his car were illegal aliens.4 8 The District
Court convicted Mendez-Rodriguez. The Ninth Circuit, applying
principles of Washington v. Texas, 49 reversed and held that the gov-
ernment's decision to deport the four Mexicans violated both the
defendant's due process guarantee and his compulsory process
rights.50
The Court of Appeals' opinion in United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal5' summarized the "essential elements" of Mendez-Rodriguez.
The elements are: "(1) unilateral Government action denying a
defendant access to a witness; and (2) prejudice, i.e., loss of a con-
ceivable benefit to the defendant from the missing witness's testi-
mony."' 52 The court reasoned that the presence of the two elements
in a case would require dismissal of the indictment, pursuant to the
Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine, because of the government's violation
44. 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976). See supra note 27. The offense consists of five ele-
ments. The prosecution must prove that: (1) the defendant transported an alien within
the United States; (2) the alien had not been lawfully admitted or was not lawfully enti-
tled to enter the United States; (3) the defendant knew that the alien was not lawfully
admitted or was not lawfully entitled to enter the United States; (4) the defendant knew
that the alien's last entry was within three years of the date of the transportation; and
(5) the defendant acted willfully in furtherance of the alien's violation of the law.
48. The three retained aliens testified that they were Mexican nationals who had
entered the United States without inspection and that the defendant stopped his car and
gave them a ride. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d at 3.
49. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
50. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d at 4-5.
51. 647 F.2d72 (9th Cir. 1981),rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 80-107.
52. 647 F.2d at 75.
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of the 'defendant's Fifth Amendment due process rights and Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process.
In Valenzuela-Bernal, the Ninth Circuit reported that a survey
of its cases following Mendez-Rodriguez confirmed that it had
"adhered to the essential elements of the original case.'" 53 For
instance, in United States v. Tsutagawa54 the court had reviewed a
set of facts similar to Mendez-Rodriguez and had explained the
necessity of adhering to the essential elements of that decision. In
Tsutagawa, Border Patrol officers arrested thirty-nine aliens. The
INS returned thirty-five of the aliens to Mexico after the aliens had
testified before a grand jury or had met with the prosecution.
Defense counsel did not have an opportunity to conduct interviews.
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the indictments, the cir-
cuit court explained the considerations prompting the decision in
Mendez-Rodriguez:
The thrust of Mendez-Rodriguez is to prevent the basic unfairness of
allowing the government to determine which witnesses will not help either
side and then to release those witnesses, for all practical purposes, beyond the
reach of the defendant. The vice lies in the unfettered ability of the govern-
ment to make the decision unilaterally. . .. A defendant has the right to
formulate his defense uninhibited by government conduct that, in effect, pre-
vents him from interviewing witnesses who may be involved and from deter-
mining whether he will subpoena and call them in his defense.55
In applying the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine the Ninth Circuit
has never conceded that unilateral action by the government that
renders a witness unavailable may be non-prejudicial.5 6 The court
construes the "conceivable benefit" test for prejudice very liberally.
A defendant need not speculate as to the content of a missing wit-
ness's testimony. A conceivable benefit stems from the deported
alien having been an eyewitness to, and an active participant in, the
crime charged because there is a strong possibility that he could have
provided material and relevant testimony concerning the events con-
stituting the crime.57 The Ninth Circuit's sweeping construction of
53. Id.
54. 500 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1974).
55. Id. at 423. The Mendez-Rodriguez case has been cited in approximately forty
later cases, the majority being Ninth Circuit decisions concerning the scope of the com-
pulsory process doctrine as defined in Mendez-Rodriguez. See, e.g., United States v.
Gonzales, 617 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Avila-Dominguez, 610 F.2d
1266 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hernandez-Gonzales, 608 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Verduzco-Macias, 463 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1972).
56. Valenzuela-Bernal, 647 F.2d at 74. In cases in which the court held that Mendez-
Rodriguez did not warrant the dismissal of an indictment, the court found that the gov-
ernment's actions were not "unilateral actions" depriving the defendant of access to the
witness. Id. at 74 n.1.
57. Id. at 74; see United States v. McQuillan, 507 F.2d 30, 32-33 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine thus protects a defendant's right to
compulsory process by requiring the government to retain all alien
witnesses until defense counsel has had a reasonable opportunity to
conduct interviews.
b. The Seventh Circuit-United States v. Calzada
In United States v. Calzada, 58 the Seventh Circuit accepted the
basic principles of the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine, but emphasized
that dismissal is not required in every case in which a potential alien
witness "somehow escapes the subpeona power of a federal court.
'59
If, however, the government acts affirmatively to make an alien wit-
ness unavailable, 60 dismissal is required. The court held that the
defendant would not have to show prejudice, because such a require-
ment would "emasculate the defendant's right to compulsory pro-
cess."' 6' The defendant would be unable to show "with any degree of
assuredness what a witness whom he has never interviewed might
say on his behalf"; thus, "a demonstration of prejudice would be
58. 579 F.2d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1978). This is the only reported Seventh Circuit
decision which addresses the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine of compulsory process. Eight
defendants-appellees were charged with conspiracy to transport and conceal illegal aliens
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) and transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976). Thirteen of the illegal aliens were arrested, detained and
interviewed by the government. After five days, the government permitted two of the
aliens who were juveniles to return to Mexico. Twenty-five days later the government
deported three of the adult aliens. Some time later the government released two more
aliens who then departed from the United States. The district court found that the gov-
ernment had acted affirmatively to make three of the thirteen aliens unavailable to the
defendants and had permitted four to become unavailable to them. Salzada, 579 F.2d
1361.
59. Id. at 1362. For example, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the government,
with court approval, may release a juvenile illegal alien from custody in the interest of
"human values." United States v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1974).
The Ninth Circuit also has held that the federal government is not obliged to detain
potential witnesses as a means of preventing their flight from the country when they have
not been charged with a crime. United States v. Verduzco-Macias, 463 F.2d 105, 106
(9th Cir. 1972). Finally, the Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant must show that the
unavailable alien might have been an actual witness to the crime for which the defendant
has been charged. United States v. McQuillian, 507 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir. 1974). In a case
in which the illegal aliens are the subject of the crime, the McQuillian requirement is
readily satisfied. Id.
60. The government acts affirmatively to make an alien witness unavailable if it offi-
dally deports the alien or if it simply facilitates the voluntary return of the alien to his
home country. See United States v. Seijo, 595 F.2d 116 (2nd Cir. 1979); United States v.
Gonzales, 617 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1980); Patel v. United States, 449 U.S. 899
(1980). In United States v. Henao, 652 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981), the court held that the
government's erroneous, but not improperly motivated, statement to defendants that an
alien witness had been deported, when in fact the witness had left the country of her own
volition, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The government had
neither deported the witness nor made her unavailable; it merely gave the defendants
erroneous information which caused them to search for her.
61. Calzada, 579 F.2d at 1362.
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impossible." 62
The government had asked the Seventh Circuit to adopt the
principle that defendants unable to show prejudice must prove
prosecutorial bad faith before dismissal of the indictment would be
in order. The court rejected this argument and stated that "willful
misconduct is irrelevant to determining the appropriateness of [a]
district court's dismissal of a defendant's indictment. The right to
compulsory process is not so much a bar against governmental mis-
conduct as it is a protection of the defendant's ability to present his
or her case."'63
c. The Sixth Circuit-United States v. Armi/o-Martinez
In United States v. Armilo-Martinez, 64 the Sixth Circuit adopted
the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine. The court stated first that a "consti-
tutional violation occurs when the first essential element of Mendez-
Rodriguez [unilateral action by the government that denies a defend-
ant access to a witness] is found." 65 The opinion stressed that the
compulsory process guarantee includes the defendant's right to have
his defense prepared and shaped by his own attorney; thus, defense
counsel must have a reasonable opportunity to interview potential
material witnesses.66 The court then addressed the prejudice
requirement of Mendez-Rodriguez, noting that although the defend-
ant must show prejudice to his case, a "very low threshold properly
defines the burden" of a defendant. 67 "The inescapable fact is that
no one knows what a witness may have observed or heard until he or
she has been interviewed. ' 68 A defendant thus makes a sufficient
showing of prejudice if he is able to identify the "relevant issues
about which the missing witness might reasonably be assumed to
have knowledge. '69
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1361.
64. 669 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1982).
65. All courts which have considered the issue agree that a constitutional viola-
tion occurs when the first "essential element" of Mendez-Rodriguez is found.
The record in the present case makes it clear that there was a violation. The
government had total control over the 14 eyewitnesses. After obtaining the
information it desired from them, the INS offered them voluntary departure and
paid the expenses of their return to Mexico. The witnesses were in Mexico, or in
the process of entering that country, when counsel for the defendants were noti-
fied of their appointments. There was absolutely no opportunity for defendants









Summarizing, the court emphasized that "a finding that a
defendant could conceivably benefit from the testimony of [missing]
witnesses is not foreclosed by exparte statements of such witnesses
to government agents where counsel for the defendant had no
opportunity to cross-examine. ' 70 The court rejected the govern-
ment's "implied suggestion" that it would be pointless to allow
defendants' attorneys to interrogate alien witnesses if government
agents turn up nothing favorable to the defendants in their inter-
views with the witnesses.
71
d The Ffth Circuit-United States v. Avila-Dominiguez
The Fifth Circuit's construction of the Mendez-Rodriguez doc-
trine is not as sweeping as that of the Ninth, Seventh or Sixth Cir-
cuits. In United States v. Avila-Dominiguez72 the Fifth Circuit
rigidified the second essential element of Mendez-Rodriguez-
prejudice. The court held that although the federal government vio-
lates the criminal defendant's constitutional rights when an alien
witness is deported before the accused is given an opportunity to
interview him,73 dismissal is not an automatic remedy for the viola-
tion. The defendant must show more than the "loss of a conceivable
benefit from the missing witness's testimony"74 before the court will
dismiss the indictment. If the defendant does not make the "slightest
suggestion" of how lost testimony would have been favorable and
material to his defense, or submit "at least a plausible theory" of
how the testimony of the absent witness might have affected the out-
come of the trial, there is no justification for dismissal.
75
e. The First Circuit-United States v. Rose
A few months before the Supreme Court's decision in
70. Id. at 1140. The circuit court concluded that the district court properly deter-
mined that the defendants had made a sufficient showing of prejudice. The defendants
"articulated the issues and identified the type of evidence which they intended to
develop-the existence of some facis which would negate a finding that they had knowl-
edge that their passengers were illegal aliens who had been in the United States less than
three years." Id. at 1137-38. See supra notes 27 & 46.
71. 669 F.2d at 1138.
72. 610 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1980).
73. Id. at 1269.
74. Id.
75. Id at 1269-70. The court also indicated that defense counsel did not "act dili-
gently to preserve the testimony of illegal aliens." Id. at 1269. The court denied dismis-
sal in United States v. Arrendondo-Morales, 624 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1980) where defense
counsel was found to have failed to take advantage of opportunities to obtain testimony
of potential witnesses. The record must indicate that the defendant has been prejudiced.
In United States v. Henao, 652 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981), the court found an absence of
constitutional violations because the missing witness had merely returned to Mexico; the
witness had not been made unavailable by unilateral government action.
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Valenzuela-Berna, the First Circuit held in United States v. Rose76
that a defendant claiming a violation of constitutional right due to
the deportation of a potential witness "must at least show that the
deported witness would have been likely to offer meaningful evi-
dence not obtainable from other available witnesses." 77 Although it
did state that "a defendant may not be required to make a detailed
offer of proof,"78 the First Circuit's formulation of the prejudice
standard nevertheless placed a higher burden on the defendant than
that mandated by Mendez-Rodriguez a decade earlier.79 By 1982,
therefore, the scope of compulsory process as delineated in Mendez-
Rodriguez, although generally accepted, had been slightly narrowed
by more than one circuit court. In United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal, 80 the Supreme Court continued the process.
B. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF COMPULSORY PROCESS-UNITED
STATES v. VALENZUELA-BERNAL
The Department of Justice strongly opposed the circuit courts'
delineations of the scope of the compulsory process clause under the
Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine. After Mendez-Rodriguez the Depart-
ment contended that the Executive Branch's responsibility to execute
Congress's immigration policy of prompt deportation of illegal
aliens required deporting illegal-alien witnesses upon the Executive's
good-faith determination that the witnesses do not possess evidence
favorable to the defendant in a criminal, prosecution. 81 In
Valenzuela-Bernal, the Attorney General's Office proposed the use
of an interest analysis approach to narrow the scope of the clause.
82
Valenzuela-Bernal was charged with transporting a single alien
in violation of Section 1324(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. At the time of his arrest, Border Patrol agents apprehended
three illegal-alien passengers from his vehicle. The agents (and not
76. 669 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1982). Appellants sought reversal of their convictions for
possession with intent to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to import and distribute
marijuana. They asserted that by deporting an alien who was a possible co-conspirator
without giving defense counsel an opportunity to determine whether he would be a use-
ful witness, the government violated their rights to due process and compulsory process.
The government had decided not to seek an indictment against the illegal alien because
he was a juvenile and had turned him over to the INS for deportation proceedings. The
trial court found that the deportation had not caused the appellants any prejudice
because other witnesses were available who could offer similar accounts. The court of
appeals affirmed the conviction.
77. Id. at 27-28.
78. Id. at 27.
79. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
80. 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982).
81. See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
82. See U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 8. See also infra notes 90-97 and accompanying
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the United States Attorney) interrogated the aliens. According to the
government, none of the aliens offered any evidence that would
exculpate the defendant. 83 The government subsequently deported
two of the aliens; the alien named in the indictment remained in the
San Diego Metropolitan Correctional Center. Valenzuela-Bernal
unsuccessfully attempted to secure the appearance of the deported
eyewitnesses at his trial. He then moved to dismiss the indictment
on the grounds that the deportation of the illegal-alien witnesses vio-
lated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amend-
ment right to call and confront witnesses. The trial judge denied
Valenzuela-Bernal's motion. The Ninth Circuit reviewed and dis-
missed the indictment.
8 4
On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Justice Depart-
ment argued first, that the government does not violate the Fifth or
Sixth Amendment when it deports illegal-alien witnesses, if it does
so after making a "reasonable good faith determination that the wit-
nesses possess no material exculpatory evidence."8 5  The Depart-
ment submitted that a defendant must support his claim of a
constitutional violation with a showing that the government's action
was "improperly motivated" or, at the least, "unjustified in light of
the circumstances. '8
6
The government maintained that there are "substantial reasons"
why it does not incarcerate illegal-alien witnesses who "appear" to
possess no material exculpatory evidence:
During the course of any given year, tens of thousands of illegal aliens are
apprehended in circumstances that would support a prosecution for trans-
porting or harboring them. The impact of the Ninth Circuit's rule has been
to require as a condition to prosecution extended incarceration of these indi-
viduals, at considerable human cost to them and of great societal cost in
terms both of substantial expenditures of money and grave impact on seri-
ously overcrowded jail facilities. This has the further consequence of forcing
prosecutors to forego otherwise valid and appropriate prosecution for lack of
adequate facilities in which to incarcerate the large numbers of illegal alien
witnesses whose deportation might result in dismissal of any prosecution.
87
83. See U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 8.
84. 647 F.2d at 75-76. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
85. See U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 7-8.
86. Id. The Department asserted that such an analysis was "in line" with the
Supreme Court's analogous decisions involving pre-indictment delay and lost evidence.
See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307
(1971); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969). But see Brief for the Respon-
dent at 46, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Respondent's Brief]: "The government's citations are inapposite. Marion and
Lovasco dealt with due process claims involving pre-indictment delay. In neither of
those cases was there deliberate prosecution action to harm the defendant. Likewise, the
loss to the defense in those cases was caused by the passage of time, rather than the
deliberate manipulation by the government."
87. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 7-8. The Department further stated:
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The Department alleged that these costs are "intolerable." Aliens
retained in accordance with Mendez-Rodriguez instruction are sel-
dom called as defense witnesses at trial.88 The Justice Department
contended that in most cases the undocumented alien becomes use-
ful to the defense only after he has been expelled from the United
States, in which event he provides a "predicate for windfall relief'8 19
if the court dismisses the indictment.
The Department of Justice's alternate position 90 was that an
alleged denial of compulsory process must be supported by the
defendant's "concrete showing" that the deported witness "could"
provide material evidence in his favor.91 The government contended
that there is no constitutional violation unless the defendant makes a
reasonable proffer of materiality-a showing that the otherwise
unavailable witness could "actually benefit" the defense 92-because
the defendant is "uniquely situated to know what the witness's testi-
mony is likely to be." 93
The government further argued that dismissal of the indictment
is a wholly inappropriate remedy for a Sixth Amendment viola-
Any discussion of the issues presented. . . must begin with a recognition that it
is by no means extraordinary-let alone unconstitutional-for defendants in
criminal cases to be unable to present all the evidence they might wish to. Evi-
dence may be unavailable because privileged, potential defense witnesses may
die or be too ill to testify, documents may have been destroyed, or witnesses or
documents may be located beyond the reach of the court's process.
Ordinarily, the court would not choose the broad remedy of dismissal. Ad. at 14. Cf.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (suppression of evidence favorable to defend-
ant and not material to guilt or punishment does not violate Fourteenth Amendment due
process guarantee). But cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1979) (administrative bur-
dens do not authorize a deprivation or narrowing of constitutional rights).
88. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 8.
89. Id.
90. In U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 8, the government claimed that it "acts at its peril
in deporting illegal aliens who could conceivably be witnesses at the defendant's trial
91. Id. at 9. There are analogous situations in which defendants are unable to have a
particular witness available to testify because they have not supplied the court with an
adequate explanation of how the witness might significantly advance the defense. "For
instance, in order for a defendant to receive a continuance of his trial to allow him to
obtain the presence of a missing witness, he is required to make a clear showing that the
witness's testimony would be favorable and material." United States v. Haldeman, 559
F.2d 31, 83 n.125 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
92. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 9. The government asserted that the Supreme Court
has adopted similar materiality requirements in decisions involving evidence unavailable
to the defendant because of pre-indictment delay or nondisclosure by the prosecution.
See Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
93. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 9. The Department stated that placing the burden on
the defendant is not an unreasonable requirement because the defendant in these cases is
in the company of the unavailable witnesses at all times relevant to the prosecution.
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tion.94 "[Tihe public interest in having the guilty brought to book"
must not be disregarded. 95 Accordingly, the remedy must not be
broader than is necessary to ensure that the defendant is not
deprived of "truly material evidence relating to the issue of guilt."
' 9 6
The government concluded that if specific testimony has been lost,
the most the accused should be entitled to is a stipulation as to what
the missing witness would say.
9 7
The Department of Justice prevailed in its second argument.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision applying
the compulsory process clause. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, stated that:
The mere fact that the Government deports such witnesses is not sufficient to
establish a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A violation of
these provisions requires some showing that the evidence lost would be both
material and favorable to the defense.
98
In holding that the defendant must make some showing that the evi-
dence lost is material to an adequate defense, the Court strictly
applied language from Washington v. Texas. "In Washington, the
Court found a violation of [the compulsory process clause of] the
Sixth Amendment when the defendant was arbitrarily deprived of
'testimony [that] would have been both relevant and material,---and
... vital to the defense.' 99 Analyzing Washington's progeny, Jus-
tice Rehnquist concluded that "Washington's intimation of a materi-
alilty requirement [was] more than borne out."u °
In the wake of Valenzuela-Bernal, the burden rests upon the
defendant to assert his right to compulsory process. "Sanctions may
be imposed on the Government for deporting witnesses only # the
criminal defendant makes a plausible showing that the testimony of
the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to
94. Id. at 10. The Supreme Court requires the remedy to be "tailored to neutralize
the taint created by the particular violation." United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,
365 (1981). But see Respondent's Brief, supra note 86, at 46:
The result in Morrison is easily distinguishable because all the persons involved
were available when the Court looked for prejudice .... Morrison alleged no
adverse effect. This reasoning in Morrison is applicable because a showing of
"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof" is sufficient to result in
dismissal of an indictment when constitutional rights are violated.
95. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966). The Court expressly ruled that
dismissal of an indictment is too drastic a remedy for the acquisition of evidence in
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
96. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 37.
97. Id. at 10.
98. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. at 3449.
99. Id. at 3446 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17 (1967)) (emphasis in
original).
100. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. at 3447-48.
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his defense."'' l Concurring in result only, Justice O'Connor noted
the practical impact of the majority's reasoning:
[T]he Court's approach thus permits the Government to make a practice of
deporting alien witnesses immediately, taking only the risk that the defend-
ant will be able to show that the deported witnesses, whom the defendant's
counsel will never be able to interview, would have provided useful testi-
mony. In effect, to the extent that the Government has confficting obliga-
tions, the defendant is selected to carry the burden of their resolution."
10 2
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. He
wrote that the majority's opinion made a "mockery" of the compul-
sory process clause. 03 He noted the Court's opinion in Jencks v.
United States"°4 which quoted from United States v. Reynolds:0 5
"[I]n criminal cases, the government can invoke its evidentiary privi-
leges only at the price of letting the defendant go free.. . . [I]t is
unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke
its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which
might be material to his defense."'' 1 Brennan added: "If the Gov-
ernment wishes to pursue criminal remedies against the accused,
then its other 'responsibilities' must yield before the rights to which
an accused is constitutionally entitled."'
10 7
II.
A CALL FOR CHANGE
One of the prevailing themes of compulsory process is that the
defense and the prosecution must have comparable opportunities to
present a case through witnesses. This requirement, however, should
not foreclose the reasonable and proper balancing of the alien wit-
ness's interest in avoiding extended detention, the defendant's inter-
est in presenting a complete defense, and the duty of the government
to police the influx of illegal aliens. At present, the federal districts
are not following procedural practices that will attain this balance.
A. CURRENT FEDERAL DISTRICT PROCEDURE
Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act10 8 in 1974. Although the
101. Id. at 3449-50 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 3451 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 3453 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
105. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
106. 102 S. Ct. at 3454 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657, 671 (1957)).
107. Id.
108. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
The Act establishes specific time limits within which the trial and certain other proce-




Act made the criminal process somewhat more efficient, 09 it gener-
ally fails to shorten the length of incarceration for the alien material
witness."l0 Public outcry often prompts reform, but the public has
shown little concern for the plight of the illegal-alien witness. Soci-
ety has classified the alien as a criminal without considering that he
has not been, and never will be, prosecuted. The government
foregoes prosecution of the alien for illegal entry in exchange for his
testimony on behalf of either the defendant or the United States."'
The federal districts that have reported Mendez-Rodriguez prog-
eny have not yet adopted consistent procedural practices that con-
currently respect the defendant's compulsory process rights while
minimizing the alien witness's incarceration period."I2 As crowded
(b) Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commis-
sion of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such
individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such
charges. If an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in which no
grand jury has been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time
for filing of the indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days.
(c)(1) In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a
defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an
offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making
public) of the information of indictment, or from the date the defendant has
appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs. If a defendant consents in writing to be tried before a
magistrate on a complaint, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the
date of such consent.
(2) Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary, the trial shall
not commence less than thirty days from the date in which the defendant first
appears through counsel or expressly waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se.
109. For criticisms of the Act, see Frase, The Speedy TrialAct of 1974, 43 U. CHi. L.
REv. 667, 669-70 (1976) ("The Act . . . contains numerous unresolved policy issues,
ambiguities, and drafting errors."); Hanson & Reed, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 in
Constitutional Perspective, 47 Miss. L.J. 365, 419-20 (1976) ("Unless additional man-
power and resources are provided, the Act will become an albatross around the neck of
the federal criminal justice system.").
110. See, e.g., United States v. Armijo-Martinez, 669 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1982)
(arraignment was held twenty days after arrest; three witnesses were incarcerated for
forty-three days); United States v. Seijo, 595 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1979) (alien witnesses
released after spending one and one-half months in detention facilities); United States v.
Calzada, 579 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1978) (potential alien material witnesses were retained
for two months awaiting accused's indictment).
111. Without the promise of immunity from suit, witnesses would plead the Fifth
Amendment. If the government did not offer immunity to illegal aliens appearing as
defense witnesses, these aliens would likely testify for the prosecution only.
112. See supra note 110; see also Seifo, 595 F.2d at 116 (deposition testimony held
admissible where prosecution had done everything possible to make aliens available for
trial and, failing that, had done everything to make the aliens' deposition testimony
available as provided by law; prosecution had not used depositions to further a speedy
incarceration release for the witnesses); United States v. Avila-Dominguez, 610 F.2d
1266 (5th Cir. 1980) (preliminary hearing was convened but INS agent unintentionally
misinformed defense counsel that nineteen aliens remained in custody, when eleven had
been deported); Calzada, 579 F.2d 1358 (defense counsel was not given a reasonable
opportunity to interview the three adult aliens who were deported, without notice to
counsel, less than a month after the defendants' arrests).
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court dockets compel judges to approach speedy-trial cases on an ad
hoc priority basis,"13 the plight of the alien witness is often ignored
when the defendant is in no hurry to proceed to trial and the local
correctional center has an empty bed. Delays in grand jury indict-
ment and the accused's arraignment frequently have extended alien
witness incarceration periods beyond thirty days." 4 Loss of time can
work to the defendant's advantage, however, especially if he calls no
witnesses at trial. The prosecution's case may weaken as the memo-
ries of witnesses fade with the passage of time.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In the early 1970s the Southern District of California designed a
procedural format that focused on safeguarding defendants' right to
compulsory process.' 15 Unfortunately, the combination of a backlog
of cases and a United States Attorney's office unwilling to take
advantage of liberal pretrial procedures has minimized severely the
safeguarding of Sixth Amendment rights.
Following the arrest of an individual for transporting or harbor-
ing illegal aliens, the government must file a complaint alleging that
all persons transported or harbored by the accused are potential
material witnesses to the offense." 6 A United States magistrate sub-
sequently addresses the witnesses, appoints an attorney to represent
them," 7 and orders their detention pending presentation of the
defendant's case to a federal grand jury.
The court expects defense counsel to interview the incarcerated
aliens prior to the defendant's arraignment and determine the extent
113. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (defendant's right to a speedy trial
must be determined on an adhoc balancing basis in which overcrowded dockets may be
considered as a reason for delay).
114. The defendant-smuggler is often an indigent, illegal alien himself. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146 (1976) governs the defendant's pretrial release. See infra note 130.
115. The Mendez-Rodriguez holding ostensibly requires the detention of all eyewit-
ness aliens, whether the transportation vehicle carries one or fifty individuals. See
United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The thrust of Mendez-Rodri-
guez is to prevent the basic unfairness of allowing the government to determine which
witnesses will not help either side and then to release those witnesses, for all practical
purposes, beyond the reach of the defendants.".
116. The number of witnesses held pursuant to the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine at the
government's request is not known. See U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 19-20.
117. The illegal alien usually qualifies as an indigent and is entitled to the appoint-
ment of counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West Supp. 1982
and West June 1982 Supp.). The attorney secures informal immunity from prosecution
for illegal entry for the alien witness in exchange for the alien's testimony. See supra
note 111. As the witness presumptively has entered illegally, he could be sentenced to six
months in custody if prosecuted and/or fined $500. An alien previously convicted for
illegal entry or previously deported faces up to two years imprisonment and/or a fine of
$1,000. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 (1976).
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of each alien's materiality to the defendant's case.1 8 The aliens then
may spend several weeks in jail 1 9 waiting for the post arraign-
ment,120 combined materiality hearing/material witness bail review.
Although the court attempts to prioritize the case and thus minimize
the length of alien witness incarceration, crowded dockets often
make the advancement of the hearing impossible.' 2 '
At the materiality hearing both the government and the defend-
ant are required to establish the materiality of the witnesses they
have chosen to have testify for their respective sides. The court will
release those witnesses whose materiality cannot be supported. 22
The retained aliens are eligible for bail if they are able to post bond.
This, however, is the rare case. Consequently, most aliens are
returned to their cells.'23
United States taxpayers also suffer as a result of the above sys-
tem; they must pay the high costs of alien witness incarceration. 24
The national emphasis on halting the flow of illegal aliens has
resulted in the detention of approximately one million undocu-
mented aliens in the past three years. ' 5 During fiscal year 1979
more than five thousand illegal-alien material witnesses were com-
mitted to the custody of the United States Marshall in the Southern
District of California. 126 The government attributes correctional
facility overcrowding to the Mendez-Rodriguez line of cases; federal
detainees often must be housed in federal prisons outside the district
118. The defendant's attorney must first give notice to the material witness's attorney.
"In some cases, defense counsel is not permitted to speak with material witnesses. Some
witnesses have used false names or made false statements or are more deeply involved in
the criminal venture and do not wish to be exposed by making any further statement
prior to trial." Respondent's Brief, supra note 86, at 5.
119. Within the Southern District of California all male witnesses are detained in the
San Diego Metropolitan Correctional Center. The court houses women and children in
local Salvation Army facilities.
120. Ideally, arraignment is held ten days after the defendant's initial appearance
before a magistrate. Telephone interview with Mr. Larry Zoglin, Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney, U.S. Attorney's Office, San Diego, Calif., Feb. 12, 1982 [hereinafter cited as Inter-
view with Zoglin].
121. See Respondent's Brief supra note 86, at 25 n.34.
122. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
123. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146,3149 (1976), any individual detained as a material
witness is entitled to be admitted to bail. "Under the liberal bail policies initiated by the
magistrates of the Southern District of California, any material witness who can show
that he has a citizen or legal resident alien relative or friend with whom he can stay
pending the outcome of the prosecution, will generally be admitted to bail under a per-
sonal surety bond." Respondent's Brief, supra note 86, at 5 n.5. Because the typical alien
material witness cannot meet the above criteria due to his indigent status, the material
witness sits in jail until trial unless the defendant agrees to stipulate to his testimony. See
infra note 130.
124. See U.S. Brief, supra note 10.
125. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 19 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. BORDER
PATROL MANAGEMENT OF THE MEXICAN BORDER 1, 6 (1981)).
126. Id.
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or in state-operated jails.' 27 The United States Attorney's Office
emphasizes that overcrowding increases when prospective alien
material witnesses are retained for periods exceeding the ideal arrest
to arraignment time span of ten days. Detention for "considerably
longer periods" is not uncommon.1 28
Government attorneys in the Southern District of California
remain opposed to the use of pretrial procedures designed to prevent
the needless detention of witnesses. 29 On the other hand, public
defenders in Southern California advocate greater use of the Bail
Reform Act,' 30 which is aimed at protecting the constitutional rights
127. In 1979, almost half of all federal inmates in the district were incarcerated as
material witnesses. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 19.
128. Id. at 18. Two to three months may elapse before trial. Interview with Zoglin,
supra note 120. The question to be asked is whether the lengthy detention times are due
solely to the procedures mandated by application of the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine.
The answer to this question seems to be no. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying
text.
129. The United States Attorney's Office in Southern California strongly opposes the
use of depositions. Respondent's Brief, supra note 86, at 7 n. 11. See infra note 134 and
accompanying text.
130. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (1976). Section 3146 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by
death, shall at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pend-
ing trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured
appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer
determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reason-
ably assure the appearance of the person as required. When such a determina-
tion is made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above
methods of release, impose the first of the following conditions of release which
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial, or, if no single
condition gives that assurance, any combination of the following conditions:
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him;
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the per-
son during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and
the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a
sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be
returned upon the performance of the conditions of release;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the
deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure
appearance as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to
custody after specified hours.
Section 3149 provides:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any crim-
inal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure his
presence by subpoena, a judicial officer shall impose conditions of release pursu-
ant to section 3146 [18 U.S.C. § 3146]. No material witness shall be detained
because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of
such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and further detention is
not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release may be delayed for a rea-
sonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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of criminal defendants while adequately securing the interests of the
government and preventing extended incarceration of material wit-
nesses.131 If the release of an alien witness is not available under the
Bail Reform Act due to a narrow interpretation of its provisions, a
court may order a deposition and the subsequent release of the
alien.'32 The deposition serves as an evidentiary substitute for live
testimony at trial.'
33
The United States Attorney's Office in the Southern District of
California regularly refuses to depose an alien material witness. The
Office will agree, however, to stipulate to the testimony that the wit-
ness was expected to give at trial. If the defendant agrees to the use
of a written stipulation at trial, the court releases the alien.'
34
The stipulation is not a pretrial procedure which will concur-
rently safeguard the defendant's right to compulsory process and
minimize the incarceration period of the illegal-alien witness. If the
stipulation of a favorable defense witness provides exculpatory evi-
dence and the truth of the testimony is not conceded by the govern-
ment, the prosecutor may contradict and impeach the absent witness
131. Respondents Brief, supra note 86, at 4-7.
132. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 provides in pertinent part:
(a) When taken. Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the
interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and
preserved for use at trial, the court may upon motion of such party and notice to the
parties order that testimony of such witness be taken by deposition, and that any desig-
nated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material not privileged, be pro-
duced at the same time and place. If a witness is committed for failure to give bail to
appear to testify at a trial or hearing, the court on written motion of the witness and upon
notice to the parties may direct that his deposition be taken. After the deposition has
been subscribed the court may discharge the witness ....
(c) Use. At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used as substantive evidence if
the witness is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, or the witness gives testimony at the trial or hearing inconsistent with his
deposition. Any deposition may also be used by any party for the purpose of contra-
dicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness. If only a part of a
deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require him to offer all
of it which is relevant to the part offered and any party may offer other parts.
133. See id. In 1966 the Southern District of California designed an alternative to the
bail reform provisions. The court issued an order which permitted the "farming out" of
an illegal entrant. The alien was given the opportunity to work on private farms in
Southern California at the minimum wage while waiting to testify at trial. He was
required to post a $2,000 appearance bond and fifty percent of his wages was assigned to
the court as security for the performance of the conditions of the bond. General Order
No. 48, United States District Court, Southern District of California, Aug. 8, 1966. In the
mid-seventies the Ninth Circuit ordered the discontinuance of the program. Telephone
interview with Court Clerk, United States District Court, Southern District of Caifornia,
Feb., 1982. It is possible that the farm out program was viewed as a continuation of the
"Bracero" program of labor importation which was terminated by an Act of Congress in
1964.
134. Interview with Zoglin, supra note 120.
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at trial as if the witness were present. 35 The government is unlikely
to stipulate to the truth of the facts underlying the witness's testi-
mony because it then would be difficult for the prosecution to sup-
port the complaint. The government does not have the option to
impeach if a deposition is used in lieu of a stipulation. Logically,
defense counsel will favor the use of a deposition if the defendant
has a strong case.
Besides favoring the use of stipulation as an alternative to the
live testimony of alien witnesses, the government claimed in
Valenzuela-Bernal that the Assistant United States Attorney's deci-
sion to return potential alien witnesses to Mexico after his unilateral
determination that the aliens possessed no material evidence 36 "rep-
resented a proper and reasonable balancing of the interests of
respondent and of the aliens and the duties of the government."' 37
The federal attorneys in the Southern District warned that should
the Supreme Court reject their balancing, their only recourse would
be to forego a large number of felony prosecutions for transporting
and harboring illegal aliens. They emphasized that the judicial sys-
tem would be unable physically to accommodate the detention of all




In Washington v. Texas, '39 the Supreme Court directed the fed-
eral courts to formulate "an independent constitutional standard to
govern the presentation of defense witnesses in criminal cases." The
courts then struck a balance that greatly favored the accused. 140
That balance tipped back in favor of the prosecution with the
Court's narrowing of the compulsory process clause in United States
v. Valenzuela-Bernal. This Note offers the following proposals in
search of an equilibrium that will respect the Washington holding
135. Westen, Compulsory Process I1, supra note 11, at 300. The question raised by
such procedure is whether convincing a defendant to use this substitute form of evidence
in place of live testimony violates the right to produce witnesses. See Orfield, Subpoena
in Federal Criminal Procedure, 13 ALA. L. REV. 1, 26 n.l 16 (1960).
136. The Assistant United States Attorney based this determination solely upon infor-
mation he received during a ten to fifteen minute telephone conversation with the Border
Patrol agent who interviewed the aliens. Respondents Brief, supra note 86, at 3.
137. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 8.
138. Id. at 21-22.
139. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
140. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 11, at 306. See also supra notes
38-43 and accompanying text.
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while accommodating the interests of the government and the mate-
rial witness.
A. A FRAMEWORK FOR PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
An examination of the procedural concerns inherent in safe-
guarding the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, mini-
mizing the incarceration period of the alien witness, and respecting
society's interests in avoiding aborted criminal prosecutions 4' and
reducing the influx of illegal aliens must focus on two time frames:
(1) the alien incarceration period prior to a materiality determina-
tion and (2) the detention period of material witnesses subsequent to
a finding of materiality. This Note proposes the adoption of a fed-
eral pretrial procedural framework that would balance the afore-
mentioned interests and alleviate the procedural concerns. The
federal districts should adopt the following practice: The govern-
ment would notify defense counsel at the time of appointment
42 of
the INS's intent to deport or grant voluntary departure, after a ten
day period, to detained illegal aliens who are potential material wit-
nesses.' 43 The court would inform counsel that the aliens would be
retained and available for questioning for ten days. If defense coun-
sel failed to act diligently to question the witnesses, the court could
rule that the defendant had waived his compulsory process rights. 44
Upon completion of the interview process, defense counsel
would be required to petition the court to detain the aliens it deemed
necessary for a defense. If the government opposed counsel's selec-
tion, the court would append a hearing for the determination of wit-
ness materiality to a preliminary examination. 45  A federal
magistrate would preside over the preliminary hearing at the close of
the ten day period.
If the prosecution agreed with the selection of material wit-
nesses, the pretrial procedure would bypass the preliminary exami-
nation and advance directly to grand jury indictment. Pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judicial officer would
141. U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 10.
142. The indigent defendant is entitled to court appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
143. The Sixth Circuit has suggested that defense counsel be notified by telephone
immediately after attorney appointments are made so that they will be able to move
quickly. Presently the Western District of Michigan employs the practice of notifying
counsel by mail. Arm(/o-Martinez, 669 F.2d at 1139.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Avila-Dominguez, 610 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1980) (The
Fifth Circuit notes that the defendant's case is "flavored with an element of waiver"
where defense counsel fails to make more than an informal inquiry of potential material
witnesses within ten days of notification that witnesses are being held.).
145. The terms "preliminary hearing" and "preliminary examination" are used inter-
changeably throughout this Note.
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impose conditions of release on the selected material witnesses; the
court would depose and subsequently release those witnesses able to
comply with the conditions. 46 The court would not, however,
detain material witnesses because of their inability to comply with a
condition of release if the testimony of the witnesses could be
secured adequately by deposition and the witnesses' further deten-
tion would not be necessary to "prevent a failure of justice."' 147 The
court would transfer these aliens to an INS detention center for
deportation hearings or voluntary departure proceedings. 48 This
transfer would be a necessary procedure because an alien tempora-
rily released without court monitoring could either return to his
home country, beyond the federal government's subpoena power, or
disappear into the United States, thereby avoiding immigration
officials. 
149
1. Incarceration of the Prospective Material Witness
For humanitarian reasons, the federal districts must not secure
defendants' compulsory process rights by incarcerating prospective
material witnesses through the time of arraignment. 50 Neither is it
in the interest of society for the federal districts to turn to the other
extreme and forego otherwise valid and appropriate prosecutions.'15
The proposed pretrial preliminary hearing 52 offers a comfortable
middle ground.
The primary purpose of a preliminary hearing is to safeguard
the defendant from unfounded charges. 153 The procedure's primary
146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3149 (1976). See supra note 130. The current criminal system
was not designed in contemplation of the alien material witness. The alien material wit-
ness, if released on bond, may return to his home country beyond the subpoena power of
the United States. It is therefore in the "interest of justice" that the court depose an
illegal-alien witness, released on bond, and thus preserve his testimony for use at trial.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15, supra note 132.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1976). See supra note 130.
148. An alien witness released on bond would not be subject to deportation. The INS
does not regain jurisdiction until after the trial. The alien may personally decide to leave
the United States if he is unable to gain employment for the interim.
149. See infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 10.
151. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
152. The preliminary hearing should be distinguished from the initial appearance,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, in which immediately after the arrest a federal magistrate sets bail
and, in cases of warrantless arrests, issues a complaint based on probable cause. The
hearing's adversarial procedures promote a more reliable determination of probable
cause than the speedy exparte review at the initial appearance. "Arraignment," FED. R.
CRIM. P. 10, refers to the proceeding in which the accused is read the indictment before
the trial court and asked to enter a plea. The federal system and each of the states pro-
vide for the use of the preliminary hearing in felony cases. See Note, The Function ofthe
Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Practice, 83 YALE. L.J. 771 (1974).
153. Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary
Hearing: An Analysis of Section 302 of the Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH L. REv.
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function is to test the legality of a defendant's custody; that is, to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed to trial. 1
54
The often ignored collateral functions of the preliminary hearing
include permitting the defendant to discover the prosecution's case,
offering an opportunity to initiate plea bargaining, and preserving
the testimony of witnesses who may not be available at a later
date. 155
Courts concerned with the detention of illegal-alien witnesses
should take notice of the last collateral function. Many jurisdictions
honor this function and allow the accused to introduce evidence in
his favor during the preliminary hearing.156 Clearly, if the right of
the defendant to introduce and preserve evidence "in his favor" is to
have any meaning, the determination of probable cause must be
based on all the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing by
either the government or the defendant. In a prosecution for the
transportation and harboring of illegal aliens, the parties introduce
evidence through the testimony of illegal-alien material witnesses. It
is, therefore, only logical to append the materiality hearing to the
preliminary examination.
In practice, federal courts conduct relatively few preliminary
hearings. Unlike most state courts, district courts hold preliminary
examinations in only about twenty percent of all prosecutions.
57
District courts often assert that because the preliminary hearing
"assesses only the validity of a defendant's custody pending action
by the grand jury, its purpose is vitiated by the grand jury's indict-
ment, which itself establishes probable cause to hold the defendant
for trial."' 158
1361, 1365-70 (1969). See FED. R. C~aM. P. 5(c); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9
(1970).
154. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.1(1) (1975).
155. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968).
156. New York, for example, permits the accused to call witnesses and present evi-
dence during the preliminary hearing at the discretion of the magistrate. N.Y. CODE
CRIM. P. § 180.60 (McKinney 1971).
157. In fiscal year 1976, 24,991 criminal prosecutions were commenced by indictment.
12,278 were commenced by information where indictment was waived, and 11,543 were
commenced by information. ANN. REP. OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
CouRTs, Table 37,254 (1977). Preliminary examinations were conducted in only 5,502
cases. Id. at 122. (An information is an accusation in the nature of an indictment. It
differs from an indictment only in that it is presented by a competent public official on
his oath of office instead of by a grand jury.)
158. Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to
Prevent Conviction without Adjudication, 78 MICH L. REv. 463, 484 (1979-1980). The
Fifth Amendment requires most federal prosecutions (prosecutions of offenses punish-
able by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year) to proceed by indictment, unless
indictment is waived by defendant. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. There is no corresponding
right to a preliminary hearing.
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By taking this view, federal courts mask the functions of the
preliminary examination. Contrary to the implications of current
federal criminal practice, discovery is an important collateral func-
tion of the preliminary hearing. 159 In civil litigation, depositions can
preserve testimony at an early stage; in criminal litigation, the pre-
liminary examination is the only available counterpart.' 60 The Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for taking depositions in
"exceptional circumstances," but only from a prospective witness
whose testimony is material and must be preserved to prevent a
"failure of justice."'16 Under current federal criminal practice, the
illegal alien does not become a prospective material witness until
after the post-arraignment materiality hearing. 62 If it is not possible
for the court to arraign the defendant within a two week period, it is
in the alien's interest for the court to conduct a combined prelimi-
nary/materiality hearing. If the court determines that the alien is a
material witness, the court should order that the alien's deposition be
taken prior to his release.
As a tactical matter, the defendant may not wish to introduce
evidence at the preliminary examination; he may fear that to do so
would be to disclose his case to the prosecution. Furthermore, thor-
ough questioning of a prospective witness by defense counsel may
amount to gratis discovery for the government. 63 The Supreme
Court addressed this concern in California v. Green, 64 quoting the
California Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Green.
165
[Tihe purpose of a preliminary hearing is not a full exploration of the merits
of a cause or of the testimony of the witnesses.. . . Even given the opportu-
nity. . . neither prosecution nor defense is generally willing or able to fire
159. Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944
(1965). See Note, The Preliminary Examination in the Federal System: A Proposal For a
Rule Change, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1416, 1422 (1968).
160. Because the preliminary hearing may serve as a valuable device for discovering
the prosecution's case, particularly in the absence of other effective means of discovery,
the prosecution logically seeks to avoid such hearings. 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 5.04[l], at 5-28 (2d ed. 1970). Defense counsel's opportunity for pre-trial cross-exami-
nation may also be valuable, as it may be difficult at trial to develop inconsistencies in
testimony never heard. Though defense counsel is given ten days in which to interview
all potential alien witnesses originally secured by the government as the prosecution's
witnesses, counsel cannot compel a witness to speak. Furthermore, witness testimony
need not come out in full at the materiality hearing.
161. See supra note 132.
162. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. See also Respondent's Brief,
supra note 86, at 7 n.10.
163. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1970). The Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of admitting preliminary hearing testimony over a defense objection that it
should not be admissible, where the prosecution witness was not available and the pro-
ceeding was conducted before a judicial tribunal equipped to provide a record of the
hearing.
164. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
165. 70 Cal.2d 654 (1969).
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all its guns at this early stage of the proceedings, for consideration of time
and efficacy... . Indeed, it is seldom that either party has had time for
investigation to obtain possession of adequate information to pursue in-
depth direct or cross-examination.1
66
At the combined preliminary/materiality hearing, the current
federal practice would not require parties to present evidence
beyond the quantum necessary to prove witness materiality. Thus,
counsel would not need to conduct in-depth examinations of the wit-
nesses. The magistrate would determine the materiality of witnesses
in accordance with standards adopted by the district court.
Although the Supreme Court has not articulated a federal standard
of materiality, guiding principles are available.
167
The compulsory process clause restricts the defendant to the
production of "witnesses in hisfavor."'6s The defendant's burden of
proving that a witness's testimony is of a favorable nature should be
a "very slight one."' 169 Courts have required only that the defendant
demonstrate that the witness he seeks is "potentially useful" 70 to his
case. His right to compulsory process is not qualified by the fact that
a witness's testimony is not entirely favorable.' 7' A witness favors
the defendant if his testimony refutes an element of the prosecution's
case, whether this is accomplished by testifying directly to the under-
lying events at issue or by testifying to the reliability of the prosecu-
tion's witnesses. 72
In United States. v. Armfaio-Martinez, 173 the Sixth Circuit pro-
posed that the district courts be required to hold the materiality
hearing on the record and issue appropriate orders.' 74 This proce-
dure would ensure that the need for the witnesses could be assessed
on appeal.' 75
166. 399 U.S. at 195 n.7 (quoting People v. Green, 70 Cal.2d 652, 663 (1969)).
167. See supra note 40. See also Westen, Compulsory Process 1, supra note 11, at 214
(the federal nature of materiality is implicit in the Supreme Court's treatment of prejudi-
cial error).
168. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI (emphasis added).
169. Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470, 476 (8th Cir. 1973).
170. Id. Cf. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 287 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 982 (1973).
171. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 283 (1973). See also FED. R. EVID. 607
("The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
him.").
172. Courts also may consider the nature of the defendant's evidence in determining
whether it is material. Character evidence may be an essential consideration in some
cases provided it is not peripheral to the main issue in dispute. See 6 J. WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE § 1908, at 580 (3d ed. 1940). Contra Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra
note 11, at 234.
173. 669 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1982).
174. Id. at 1140.
175. See Note, The Preliminary Examination in the Federal System, supra note 159, at
1419. (In addition, the information obtained at a preliminary hearing may provide a
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A federal court's supervisory jurisdiction over the evidentiary
rules applied in criminal cases involves an exercise of discretion.
76
Principles of common law govern the rules of evidence. The federal
courts interpret these principles in the "light of reason and experi-
ence."'177 If the defendant is concerned that he will disclose his case
to the prosecution during an adversarial materiality hearing, the
court should order separate inquisitional proceedings to determine
the bases and validity of the testimony of potential government and
defense witnesses. Because the magistrate must also establish the
reliability of a witness's testimony, it can be argued that an adver-
sarial hearing, as opposed to a separate inquisitional hearing, may
infringe upon the due process rights of the defendant. It is conceiva-
ble that an illegal alien selected by the defense as a material witness
may feel intimidated by the government's presence at an adversarial
hearing. The alien may be aware that he presumptively has commit-
ted a crime against the United States. He may, therefore, decide to
alter his testimony to ensure that he will not be prosecuted. As the
guilt or innocence of the defendant is not in issue at this time, coun-
sel should have no objection to separate proceedings.
78
It is unlikely that a court could hold a materiality hearing prior
to indictment without simultaneously holding a preliminary exami-
nation. Without such an examination, defense counsel would not be
informed sufficiently of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged. The prosecutor's power to bypass the preliminary hear-
ing179 increases the importance to the defendant of the grand jury's
screening function. The function of this group of laymen is to check
the prosecution by eliminating charges where the evidence does not
establish probable cause for arrest. 80
A materiality hearing held prior to indictment thus would
require the consent of both parties. If the case is not complicated
with facts and defense counsel has a full understanding of the crimi-
nal offense charged, the court may agree to convene the materiality
hearing. 181
basis for avoiding trial altogether, a contingency which benefits the prosecution, the
defense, and the public.).
176. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309 (1967); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
177. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
178. McCray, 386 U.S. at 311. The Court has been unwilling to formulate a "federal
evidentiary rule of compulsory disclosure where the issue is a preliminary one of prob-
able cause, and guilt or innocence is not at stake." Cf. United States v. Rawlinson, 487
F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1973) (use of in camera hearing to determine whether informant's testi-
mony would be of sufficient help to defendant so as to require disclosure of identity of
informant was appropriate).
179. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
180. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
181. The decision to hold the hearing lies within the discretion of the court.
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2 Release of the Material Witness-The Use of Substitute
Evidence in Place of Live Testimony
1 82
Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 1966183 to ensure that
all persons, regardless of their financial status, would not be detained
pending their appearance to answer charges or to testify where
detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest. 1
84
Section 3149 of the Act 85 addresses the material witness's eligibility
for release. A federal court shall not detain an individual due to his
inability to comply with any condition of release 86 if his testimony
can adequately be secured by deposition and further detention is not
necessary to prevent a failure of justice.
1 87
Case law and congressional legislation require that aliens pres-
ent within the United States be given the same fundamental proce-
dural rights as United States citizens. 88 Thus, if the detention of an
alien witness is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice, the court
should secure the alien's testimony by deposition. Unfortunately,
not all United States Attorneys recognize this development in the
law. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
California opposes the practice of deposing alien material witnesses
as a matter of policy in nearly every criminal case in the district.18 9
If United States Attorneys are willing to compromise and initially
detain all material witnesses for a ten day period, the defendant
182. See Westen, Compulsory Process , supra note 11, at 191.
183. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (1976)). This
was the first substantial "reform" in bail law in 176 years. See Rails, Bail in the United
States, 74 CASE & COMM. 38, 43 (Nov.-Dec. 1969).
184. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. Vol. II, p. 2293 (1966).
See also 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 46.02[l], at 46-48.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1976).
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46 governs the administration of bail for witnesses and defend-
ants. Congress amended the rule in 1972 to bring it into general conformity with the Bail
Reform Act of 1966. Subdivision (b) of the rule deals with an issue not dealt with by the
Act-release during trial.
187. Bail is an absolute right in all but capital offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976).
188. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1895). Aliens are entitled to a
jury trial and procedural due process:
[A]ll persons within the territory of the United States are entitled, to the protec-
tion guaranteed by [the fifth and sixth] amendments, and. . . even aliens shall
not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law....
Id. at 238. The detention of an alien material witness is notperse unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court has held that statutes which permit a material witness to be jailed if his
presence at trial cannot be otherwise secured are constitutional. See Barry v. United
States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
189. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 86, at 7 n.10. See also U.S. Brief, supra note
10, at 20-21 n.9:
[D]epositions are at best of marginal value in cases like this one. When the wit-
ness. . . [is able to provide little evidence], a deposition is basically a waste of
time and money. In cases where the witness has genuinely material evidence, it
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must also be willing to compromise. In most circumstances, contem-
porary application of the confrontation and compulsory process
clauses compels the defendant's acceptance of deposition testimony
of witnesses both for and against him when the witnesses' detention
serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.
a. Confrontation
A defendant's right to confront witnesses against him' 90 is not
absolute. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, per-
mitting the use of depositions, 91 and the recognized exceptions to
the hearsay rule192 limit the scope of the confrontation clause. Tra-
ditionally the courts have recognized an exception to the confronta-
tion requirement when the prosecution's witness is unavailable and
"has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the
same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that
defendant."' 93 The right of cross-examination initially afforded to
defense counsel at pretrial proceedings provides substantial compli-
ance with the purposes behind the confrontation clause.' 94 The
prosecution, however, must show that it has made a good-faith effort
to produce the witness to enable the trier of fact to evaluate the cred-
ibility of the witness's testimony in light of demeanor on the witness
is likely that, absent exigent circumstances, both the defendant and the govern-
ment would prefer to have the witness available for trial.
Id. See also supra note 129.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
191. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e), supra note 132.
192. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) provides:
(a) D6fnition of unavailabiit y. 'Unavailability as a witness' includes situa-
tions in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testify-
ing concerning the subject matter of his statement;
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his state-
ment despite an order of the court to do so;
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement;
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been
unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under
sub-division (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance of testimony) by process of other
reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack
of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from
attending or testifying.
This section is the standard for admissibility of deposition testimony in FED. R. CRIM. P.
15(e). See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
193. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1965). See also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1405 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
194. Barber, 390 U.S. at 722.
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stand.195
In sanctioning the government's use of an out-of-court state-
ment of its own witness, the controlling question for courts under the
confrontation clause is whether the trier of fact has "a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the. . . prior statement."' 96 This
standard implies that even evidence submitted in its best available
form may be inadmissible if it does not have the essential "indicia of
'reliability.' "197
The issue of confrontation seldom arises in criminal prosecu-
tions for the illegal transportation or harboring of illegal aliens.
98
In the Southern District of California the United States Attorney's
Office either incarcerates government witnesses through trial, stipu-
lates to their testimony, or foregoes criminal prosecution.'99 Cer-
tainly, if the court released material witnesses pursuant to the Bail
Reform Act2° and the witnesses did not appear at trial, the court
would accept the deposition testimony of government witnesses.
The subsequent disappearance of prosecution witnesses beyond the
federal subpoena power also should comply with the witness
"unavailability" requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a).20,
The defendant's right of confrontation would have been satisfied at
the earlier preliminary hearing or deposition proceeding.
(b) Compulsory Process
Whether requiring a defendant to use a substitute form of evi-
dence in lieu of favorable live witness testimony violates his right to
compulsory process is an issue that must be decided in relation to
federal constitutional standards.20 2 Although depositions may, on
occasion, be an acceptable substitute for live testimony, the use of
195. Id. at 724-25. "In short, a witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of the forego-
ing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have
made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." Id See generally Phillips, The
Confrontation Clause and the Scope of the Unavailability Requirement, 6 MICH. J. L. REF.
327 (1973). See also Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3d Cir. 1967).
196. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
197. Id. See generally Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due
Process-A Proposalfor Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6
CONN. L. REv. 529 (1974).
198. See Seifo, 595 F.2d 116 (where deported aliens had become unavailable, but not
for the purpose of preventing them from testifying against the defendant, and where the
prosecution had done everything in its power to hold the aliens and produce them at
trial, but had been unsuccessful in persuading the INS to retain them in custody, deposi-
tions taken from those aliens in sessions where defense counsel was present were admissi-
ble at trial).
199. See U.S. Brief, supra note 10, at 20-21 n.9.
200. See supra note 130.
201. See supra note 192.
202. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See also supra notes 36-43 and
accompanying text.
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depositions often deprives the defendant of "the opportunity to pres-
ent evidence of his witness's demeanor and credibility." 20 3 The
accused does have the right to produce all material evidence, "all
evidence in his favor that could reasonably affect the judgment of
the jury.' ' 204 Whether evidence of a witness's demeanor is material
"will depend upon the nature of the case." 205 Thus, in instances in
which a defendant is not entitled to produce a witness in person, he
cannot object to the use of deposition evidence on the ground that it
deprives him of material demeanor evidence. Whether the defend-
ant is in fact entitled to produce the witness is the crucial question in
cases where the INS deports a potential alien witness.
In a prosecution for the transportation and harboring of illegal
aliens, evidence of an illegal-alien witness's demeanor and credibil-
ity usually will not be material. This conclusion follows from the
Supreme Court's discussion of materiality in Washington. In that
case, the Court implied that the federal definition of materiality is
implicit in the Court's treatment of the concept of prejudicial
error.2°6 Thus, evidence is material to a defendant's case if its exclu-
sion would be prejudicial by federal standards.
20 7
Rarely will the defendant's case suffer prejudice if the accused is
unable to present evidence of the demeanor and credibility of an
illegal-alien witness. This evidence is more likely to lessen the bur-
den of proof on the prosecution than to benefit the defense. The
prosecution must prove that the defendant was aware of the illegal
status of the alien at the time of the alleged felony.208 When an ile-
gal-alien witness takes the stand, the jury often evaluates the
demeanor and credibility of an illiterate, poorly dressed individual
who speaks little or no English. If the witness appears reasonably
"illegal" to the jury, they naturally will wonder why the defendant
did not question the legality of his act. It is reasonable, therefore, to
expect that the defendant will accept the testimony of pretrial hear-
ings as an adequate version of the substance of his witness's
testimony.
The most difficult compulsory process issue is whether a defend-
ant has a constitutional right to introduce testimony in the form of
substitute evidence.209 If the jurisdiction's evidentiary rules permit
203. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 11, at 300-01.
204. Id.
205. Id. "In the rare case in which the weight of evidence depends entirely on its
content, the loss of demeanor evidence may be immaterial in that it could not reasonably
affect the judgment of the jury." Id.
206. See supra note 40.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148, 1157 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the use of depositions when a witness is unavailable, the constitu-
tional issue will not arise. Within the context of federal prosecutions
for transporting or harboring illegal aliens, federal courts should
read the word "unavailable" in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) so
as to coincide with the subsequent disappearance of an alien defense
witness who was released on bond pending trial or who was
deported because of his inability to meet conditions of release when
his further detention was not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.
The ultimate decision to release an alien material witness lies
within the discretion of the court. The judge decides whether "fur-
ther detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. 210 If
the court believes that the jury is entitled to judge witness credibility
on the basis of personal observation of appearance and demeanor,
the parties should consider the alternative of video-taped depositions
under oath.21' When the interests of all parties are weighed, the
manifest "failure of justice" is the continued detention of the alien
witness.
B. A PROPOSAL FOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION
Section 1252 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 21 2 grants
the Attorney General wide discretion to parole any alien into the
United States temporarily and under such conditions as he may pre-
scribe for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest. This status
permits the individual to work during the duration of his parole.
Section 1252 appears to solve the dilemma created by the desire
to release the incarcerated alien witness prior to trial and the con-
flicting need to secure his presence within the court's jurisdiction.
The Act, however, only conveys authority for the parole of an alien
pending an appearance "before an administrative tribunal."213 The
INS has no authority to parole or detain an individual solely for
appearance as a material witness in a federal criminal prosecu-
tion.214 Although the INS desires to assist the United States Attor-
ney's Office, it may not parole or detain an alien in excess of the time
210. 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1976).
211. "It remains to be seen whether videotaped depositions taken under oath and
recorded in advance of trial can, constitutionally, be substituted for the production of
available witnesses." Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 11, at 301-02 n.418.
"With respect to the right of compulsory process, the answer depends on whether the
difference between viewing the witness's demeanor in person and viewing it on videotape
is a difference that could reasonably affect the judgment of the jury." Id.
212. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976). The Attorney General of the United States has responsi-
bility for administering and enforcing the Act.
213. INS, Internal Memo from Regional Commissioner, Eastern Region, to District
Directors and Officers, January 14, 1977.
214. Id.
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necessary to effect removal under administrative proceedings unless
there is a judicial or administrative order or compelling circum-
stance dictating the contrary.
215
No precedent exists finding a "compelling circumstance" in a
situation where the retention of an illegal alien is required solely as a
material witness in a criminal proceeding. Such a finding, which
would necessitate greater cooperation and coordination between the
United States Attorney's Office and the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, is desirable. It would transfer the authority for moni-
toring the parole of an alien material witness from the courts to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and would alleviate inmate
overcrowding in metropolitan correctional centers.216 The govern-
ment could no longer choose to forego immigration felony prosecu-
tions due to the judicial inconveniences and financial burdens
associated with incarcerating material witnesses.
217
It is logical for the INS to continue to monitor the alien witness
throughout the judicial proceedings. The Service is ultimately
responsible for the alien's departure from the United States.2 ' 8
Under current procedure, the district court returns the alien to the
Service after he has testified at trial. If the alien chooses to return to
his homeland voluntarily, the Service does not initiate deportation
proceedings. 21
9
A problem associated with alien witness parole has been the
courts' inability to secure the witness's presence at trial. The alien
often returns home before the trial date if he is unable to obtain
employment. Legislation before the House of Representatives and
Senate judiciary committees in 1981 offered a solution to this
problem.2
20
The Omnibus Immigration and Control Act 22' was the Reagan
Administration's immigration reform bill. Title VI of this bill, the
Temporary Mexican Workers Act, proposed temporary legislation
and therefore 'would not have amended provisions of the existing
Immigration and Nationality Act.222 The title would have estab-
lished a two-year program for the interim admission of Mexican
nationals to work in jobs, skilled or unskilled, in any field for which
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
218. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
219. Interview with Zoglin, supra note 120.
220. S. 1765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 12056-72 (1981). H.R. 4832, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1981).
221. Id.
222. S. 1765, Title VI, § 601(a) (1981).
[Vol. 16:81
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
there is a shortage of American workers.223 During the two-year test
period, the program Was to be limited to 50,000 workers a year.
224 If
the paroled alien witnesses were included in a similar program, the
INS would not incur additional expenses by accepting responsibility
for the detention and welfare of alien witnesses.
The Omnibus Immigration and Control Act died in Committee;
however, the Senate and House subsequently introduced, in identi-
cal bills, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982.225 The
Act would permit United States employers to petition for temporary
nonimmigrant workers to work in jobs if "there are not enough local
U.S. workers for the job ... and .. . similarly employed U.S.
workers' wages will not be adversely affected. ' 226 The Act would
limit temporary workers to a maximum eight-month stay per year,
except for agricultural workers who may stay for more than one year
if previously so allowed.
227
The Senate passed the reform bill on August 17, 1982.228 The
House Judiciary Committee sent the bill to the floor, but it did not
pass before the close of the second session of the 97th Congress.
Both the Senate and the House reintroduced the Act in the 98th
Congress.
229
Illegal-alien witnesses detained in the United States should be
granted "temporary nonimmigrant worker" status until trial. An
employed alien witness has a financial incentive to comply with his
conditions of release. Furthermore, granting an alien witness "tem-
porary nonimmigrant worker" status reduces the government's
financial burden, as the witness need not be detained at government
expense. The "temporary nonimmigrant worker" status also pro-
vides the defendant a guarantee that his right to compulsory process
will be respected by the presence of the illegal-alien witness at
trial.230
C. EXTRADITIoN-A PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE
Once an alien witness is released from custody and either
deported or voluntarily returned to his country, the individual lies
beyond the subpoena power of the United States Marshall Serv-
223. Id. at § 601(b).
224. Id. at § 601(a).
225. S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
226. Id. at Title II, Part B.
227. Id.
228. 1 CONG. INDEX (CCH), 20,515 (97th Cong. 1981-1982).
229. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). S.
529 passed the Senate on May 18, 1983. H.R. 1510 is awaiting action by the House.
230. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983, supra note 225, at Title IX, Part B.
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ice.23 1 The Service can neither send officers to arrest and return the
witness nor prosecute the witness for contempt of court as long as the
witness is physically absent from the court's jurisdiction. Accord-
ingly, the federal government may only "request that the foreign
country arrest and extradite the witness for criminal proceedings.
'232
The Departments of State and Justice have recommended that
the federal government seek greater cooperation from Mexico in
efforts to prevent illegal migration.233 While Mexico may be willing
to lend limited assistance due to its interest in preventing the mis-
treatment of its citizens by professional smuggling rings,234 it would
be unrealistic to forecast a broadening of the scope of the United
States-Mexico extradition treaty235 to include material witnesses to
foreign crimes. Bilateral relations have not reached the point where
extradition will become routine for offenses such as contempt. The
current treaty limits extradition to offenders of specified, relatively
severe crimes.2
36
The illegal migration of aliens into the United States benefits
Mexico economically. The Special Study Group on Illegal Immi-
grants from Mexico 237 reported that Mexico realizes valuable eco-
nomic benefits through earnings sent by employed illegal aliens to
relatives at home. Furthermore, the transfer of willing workers to
the United States alleviates the country's critical unemployment
problem. Mexican officials have commented that the elimination of
the illegal migration "safety valve" could have serious social and
economic consequences for Mexico.
23 8
Mexico has little to gain from aiding federal district courts in
punishing the smugglers who bring the Mexican unemployed one
step closer to employment, except for providing its citizens a certain
231. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783, 1784 (1976). These statutes authorize federal courts to
subpoena United States citizens and domiciliaries from anywhere in the world to appear
and testify in court.
232. Westen, Compulsory Process 1, supra note 11, at 291-92.
233. DEP'TS OF JUSTICE AND STATE, supra note 5, at 24.
234. Mexico enacted laws in 1974 that provide penalties of up to ten years imprison-
ment and/or fines of up to $4,000 for aiding the illegal migration of Mexican workers.
See id. at 25. -
235. Treaty of Extradition, Feb. 22, 1899, United States-Mexico art. II, T.S. No. 242
(effective April 22, 1899); Supplemeiltary Extradition Convention, June 25, 1902, T.S.
No. 421 (effective April 13, 1903); Supplementary Extradition Convention, Dec. 23, 1925,
44 Stat. 2409 (1927), T.S. No. 741 (effective July 11, 1926); Supplementary Extradition
Convention Aug. 16, 1939, 55 Stat. 1133 (1942), T.S. No. 967 (effective Apr. 14, 1941).
236. Treaty of Extradition, Feb. 22, 1899, United States-Mexico, art. II, T.S. No. 242
(effective April 22, 1899).
237. The study group was comprised of Representatives from the Departments of
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Justice, Labor, and State. President Nixon
established the group in August 1972 to explore the problems relating to illegal immigra-
tion from Mexico. DEPTS OF JUSTICE AND STATE, supra note 5, at 25 n. I.
238. Id. at 25.
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degree of protection from inscrupulous professional smugglers.239
Thus, at the present time, the criminal defendant's right to compul-
sory process cannot be secured by an attempt to extradite an
"unavailable" 240 alien witness.
CONCLUSION
The Executive Branch has the responsibility to execute the
immigration policy of Congress. The Executive also has a duty to
ensure that criminal defendants receive the fundamental fairness
inherent in the due process and compulsory process clauses. In
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal these two obligations conflicted.
The Supreme Court chose to require defendants "to carry the bur-
den of their resolution. ' 241 Specifically, for a defendant's compulsory
process right to prevail, he must make a plausible showing of how
the unavailable alien witness's testimony would have been both
material and favorable to his defense.
The irony of the situation is that even if a defendant can show
that a deported alien witness's testimony would have been both
material and favorable, he never has the opportunity to exercise his
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. Instead, the court
simply dismisses the indictment; the defendant smuggler goes free.
This solution does not benefit society at large. Alone, the govern-
ment's prompt deportation of an illegal alien does not solve the
problem of illegal immigration. The government also has a duty to
prosecute smugglers, some of whom may go unpunished if the INS
continues to deport potential material alien witnesses.
The Supreme Court should exercise its supervisory power
242
over the federal courts and encourage the adoption of a pretrial pro-
cedure that will guarantee the defendant's exercise of compulsory
process, reduce the incarceration time of potential material alien wit-
nesses, and respect the government's responsibility to combat illegal
immigration. Congress should amend the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1982 to include illegal-alien witnesses in the tempo-
rary nonimmigrant worker program. If paroled alien witnesses were
included in the program, the INS would not incur additional
expense by accepting responsibility for the detention and welfare of
alien witnesses. A new pretrial procedure working in unison with a
239. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 192. In the future the costs of extraditing witnesses from the inte-
rior of Mexico may make extradition impractical.
241. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. at 3451 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
242. "This Court has not hesitated to use its supervisory power over federal courts to
set standards to ensure the fair administration of justice." Id. at 3452 n.2 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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nonimmigrant worker program would achieve a reasonable balance
of the duties of the federal government, the rights of the criminal
defendant, and the concerns of the alien witness.
Kathryn Bucher
